Abstract A social choice correspondence is self-implementable in strong equilibrium if it is implementable in strong equilibrium by a social choice function selecting from the correspondence itself as a game form. We characterize all social choice correspondences implementable this way by an anonymous social choice function satisfying no veto power, given that the number of agents is large relative to the number of alternatives. It turns out that these are exactly the social choice correspondences resulting from feasible elimination procedures as introduced in Peleg (1978) .
Introduction
A social choice correspondence chooses alternatives based on the preferences of the agents. Generally speaking one looks for social choice correspondences with desirable properties, such as anonymity, Pareto optimality, and many more. The problem, as already studied in Hurwicz (1972) , is that preferences may be private knowledge or, more generally, agents are entitled to report any preferences they wish, resulting in alternatives chosen on the basis of the wrong information, and thus in the desired properties of the social choice correspondence being violated. Requiring strategy-proofness of a social choice function, meaning that no agent can ever benefit from not reporting truthfully, is in general too strong and results in dictatorship (Gibbard, 1973 , Satterthwaite, 1975 .
Implementation theory is concerned with finding game forms (mechanisms, decentralized systems) of which the equilibrium (Nash, strong, etc.) alternatives in the game with the true preferences coincide with the alternatives assigned to those preferences by the social choice correspondence under consideration.
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In particular since the work of Hurwicz (1972) there is a large literature on necessary and/or sufficient conditions for implementation of social choice correspondences under various equilibrium concepts, with Maskin (1999) as one of the basic contributions. For an overview of this literature up to the current millennium see Jackson (2001) .
A well-recognized drawback of many of the game forms or mechanisms employed in implementation theory is that they tend to be fairly complicated and not easy to use in practice. For instance, they may require agents to report not just preferences but complete preference profiles, to report integer numbers, etc. In the present paper, we therefore ask what is still feasible by using what we call 'self-implementation': this means implementation by a game form that is simply a selection (social choice function) from the correspondence under consideration and, thus, requires the agents just to report their own preferences and nothing else. Apart from the simplicity of such a mechanism its use is also defendable in the sense that it is close to the social choice correspondence that is deemed desirable. Specifically, we ask the following question: which social choice correspondences are self-implementable in strong equilibrium (that is, strategy-profiles such that no coalition can gain by deviating, as introduced in Aumann, 1959) ?
It turns out that under some natural additional conditions we are able to give a precise answer to this question: if the number of agents is not too small and the social choice function that selects from the correspondence and implements it is anonymous and satisfies 'no veto power' then the correspondence must result from so-called feasible elimination, as already introduced in Peleg (1978) . The number of agents being not too small will be made precise and, together with the no veto power property boils down to this number being at least as large as twice the number of alternatives minus one -a condition satisfied in most (political) elections. No veto power means that no agent on its own is able to exclude any alternative from being chosen -again a natural condition in larger elections. This result is quite involved: its proof can be based on a selection from existing results in the literature, as we will indicate; nevertheless, for the convenience of the reader and in order to avoid having to introduce many additional concepts, we present a completely self-contained proof.
As already mentioned, the concept of feasible elimination was introduced by Peleg (1978) , in order to construct so-called exactly and strongly consistent social choice functions: for such social choice functions there is for every profile of (true) preferences a strong equilibrium profile resulting in the truthful alternative. What we explicitly add in the present paper is not only that social choice functions that select from a feasible elimination social choice correspondence implement this correspondence in strong equilibrium, but also that under the additional conditions mentioned above, the feasible elimination correspondence is the unique correspondence for which this can be done.
Section 2 introduces the main concepts and Section 3 presents the main result. Most parts of the proof are shifted to the Appendix. Section 4 concludes.
Notations
The following basic notations are used throughout. For a set D, |D| denotes the cardinality of D, P (D) the power set, i.e., the set of all subsets of D, and P 0 (D) the set of all nonempty subsets of D.
Self-implementation in strong equilibrium
Let A be the set of m alternatives, m ≥ 2, and let N = {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2, be the set of voters. Subsets of N are called coalitions. Let L be the set of all preferences, i.e., complete, antisymmetric and transitive binary relations, on A.
, where Σ i is the strategy set of player (voter) i ∈ N , and π :
i is a strong equilibrium (Aumann, 1959) in the game (g, R N ) if there are no S ∈ P 0 (N ) and
In this case we also say that the game form g implements the SCC H in strong equilibrium. A social choice function F can be identified with the game form in which the strategy set of each voter is the set L and the outcome function is F , i.e., to each strategy profile (preference profile) Q N ∈ L N the outcome (alternative) F (Q N ) is assigned. We denote this game form simply by F . Then (F, R N ) is a game for every R N ∈ L N . Let H be a social choice correspondence. We call H strong self-implementable if there is a social choice function F such that
In words, the selection F from H implements H in strong equilibrium. We assume that every SCC H (including every SCF, since this can be viewed as a single-valued SCC) occurring in the rest of the paper is non-imposed, i.e., for every x ∈ A there is an R N ∈ L N such that H(R N ) = {x}. A well-known necessary condition (Maskin, 1999; see also Jackson, 2001 ) for H to be (self-)implementable is the following.
Maskin monotonicity For all
R N = (R 1 , . . . , R n ), Q N = (Q 1 , . . . , Q n ) ∈ L N , and x ∈ H(Q N ), if xQ i y implies xR i y for all y ∈ A and i ∈ N , then x ∈ H(R N ).
Main result
The purpose of this section is to characterize all social choice correspondences H that are self-implementable in strong equilibrium if the number of voters is relatively large and the selection that implements H satisfies two natural properties, namely anonymity and no-veto power. The latter means that no voter on his own should be able to exclude any alternative from being chosen. We arrive at this theorem by combining a number of existing results in the literature, but our proof will be self-contained. We start with the following concept, introduced by Peleg (1978) . A social choice function F is exactly and strongly consistent (ESC) 
. We now immediately have the following result.
The SCCs of interest in this section are based on so-called feasible elimination procedures, defined for the case where n + 1 ≥ m. Informally, first, assign weights β(x) ∈ N to the alternatives x ∈ A such that the sum of these weights is equal to n + 1. Consider a preference profile and take an alternative x that is bottom ranked at least β(x) times. Eliminate β(x) preferences where x is bottom ranked, and next eliminate x everywhere in the remaining profile. Repeat this procedure until one alternative remains.
Formally, we have the following definition. Let n + 1 ≥ m. A function β : A → N such that x∈A β(x) = n + 1 will be called a weight function.
Thus, in a feasible elimination procedure
, by condition (c) alternative x 1 is bottom ranked for all voters in C 1 and by condition (b), |C 1 | = β(x 1 ). Now eliminate the preferences of the voters in C 1 , and eliminate x 1 from the preferences of the remaining voters. In the remaining profile, x 2 is bottom ranked for all voters in C 2 by condition (c), and by condition (b), |C 2 | = β(x 2 ), so that the preferences of the voters in C 2 can be eliminated and x 2 can be eliminated from the remaining profile. And so on and so forth. Observe that after eliminating x 1 there are n−β(x 1 ) voters left, after eliminating x 2 there are n − β(x 1 ) − β(x 2 ) voters left, and after eliminating x m−1 there are
An important observation about f.e.p.s is the following. Suppose an alternative x is bottom ranked by (at least) the voters in some coalition S with
Then x must be eliminated in every f.e.p. for R N . To see this suppose there is an f.e.p. in which x is not eliminated and let y be the alternative eliminated last, say via coalition T . Then the finally left voters form a coalition S containing S. We have
It is not difficult to see that there exists always at least one f.e.p. under the assumptions in the definition. If every alternative x j is bottom ranked less than β(x j ) times, then the total number of voters is at most m j=1 β(x j ) − m, which is equal to n + 1 − m and therefore strictly smaller than n. A similar argument can be made after elimination of each alternative x 1 , . . . , x m−2 .
Let β be a weight function. An alternative
The following lemma repeats the known result that M β is Maskin monotonic. For completeness, a proof can be found in the appendix, where also references to the literature are provided. For a weight function β as in Definition 3.2 we use the notation β(B) = x∈B β(x) for B ⊆ A.
Lemma 3.3. Let β be a weight function. Then M β is Maskin monotonic.
Next, we provide a characterization of maximal alternatives. Again, see the appendix for references and a proof. 
(ii) There are no S ∈ P 0 (N ) and
The following result says that M β is self-implementable in strong equilibrium by any selection from it.
Proposition 3.5. Let β be a weight function and let
by lowering x j to the last position in the preferences of the voters in
N is a strong equilibrium of (F, R N ). Indeed assume on the contrary that there exist S ∈ P 0 (N ) and
It is sufficient to show that (ii) of Lemma 3.4 holds for x. Suppose not. Then there is an S ∈ P 0 (N ) and B ∈ P 0 (A), x / ∈ B, such that yR i x for all y ∈ B and i ∈ S, and |S| ≥ β(A \ B). Consider a profile P S ∈ L S with A \ B at bottom for all voters in S. Then by the remarks following Definition 3.2, all elements of A \ B will be eliminated in any f.e.p.
hence S has an improvement, a contradiction to the assumption that Q N is strong equilibrium of (F, R N ).
Before turning to a converse of Proposition 3.5 we introduce two additional possible properties of a social choice correspondence H. Of course, these properties also apply for a social choice function F , since a social choice function can be identified with a single-valued social choice correspondence. Also this proposition can be deduced from earlier results in the literature, but for completeness we provide a self-contained proof in the appendix. The following theorem is a corollary to Propositions 3.5 and 3.6 and the main result of this section. Proof. By Lemma 3.1 and Proposition 3.6 it follows that there is a weight function β such that
for all R N ∈ L N , which completes the proof.
Theorem 3.7 says, roughly, that if the number of voters is relatively large, then the only social choice correspondences which are self-implementable in a reasonable way in strong equilibrium are the correspondences M β . Typically, in political elections the constraint n + 1 ≥ m is satisfied and the conditions of Anonymity and No Veto Power for a final selection of a candidate are natural if not compelling.
The conditions of Anonymity and No Veto Power in the theorem are on the selection F . In general we can make the following observations. It is possible that H is anonymous but F is not: let H assign to every profile the set of all top-ranked alternatives, and let F select from that set the top-ranked alternative of agent 1. Also, F can be anonymous but H not: fix an alternative a ∈ A and let H assign all top-ranked alternatives, but leave out a if this is top-ranked by agent 1 alone, and let F select from H the alternative that is ranked maximally according to a fixed preference Q which has a last. Further, if F satisfies No Veto Power then also H does, but the converse is not necessarily true: fix an alternative a, let H assign all top-ranked alternatives, and let F select from that according to a fixed ordering Q, but leave out a as a possible choice if it is last ranked by agent 1. Then H satisfies No Veto Power but F does not.
Since, by the preceding remarks, M β in the theorem satisfies No Veto Power, it follows by the definition of a β-f.e.p. that β(x) ≥ 2 for all x ∈ A and, thus, that the number of agents is at least as large as twice the number of alternatives minus one.
Concluding remarks
Clearly, the approach in this paper leaves many open questions. We mention two of these. First, which social choice correspondences are self-implementable in strong equilibrium if the number of agents is relatively small -for instance, a small group of people in a restaurant has to make some common choices from a large menu of dishes? Second, what can be said about self-implementation in Nash equilibrium?
A Remaining proofs A.1 Proofs of Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4
Proof of Lemma 3.3.
3 Let Q N and R N be as in the definition of Maskin monotonicity, and x ∈ M β (Q N ). Without loss of generality we assume that there is a voter v such that
If v ∈ C j with j > 1, then we may eliminate x 1 , . . . , x j−1 and all voters in C 1 ∪ . . . ∪ C j−1 first, and next continue the argument with the remaining profile, where now all voters in C j have x j bottom ranked according to Q C j . So, without loss of generality, let v ∈ C 1 . The rest of the proof is based on a three step algorithm.
Step 1 If the bottom alternative of R v is equal to x 1 , then f * is still an f.e.p. for R N and we are done. Otherwise, go to Step 2.
Step 2 Let the bottom alternative of R v be x = x 1 , so ∈ {2, . . . , m − 1}. If all voters in C have x as bottom alternative in R N , then we can first eliminate x via C and go back to Step 1 for the reduced profile. Otherwise, go to Step 3.
Step 3 Takev ∈ C with x not as bottom alternative and note that the bottom alternative of Rv = Qv is some x j with j < (since x j must be eliminated before x in f * ). Then modify C toĈ = (C ∪ {v}) \ {v} and modify C 1 tô C 1 = (C 1 ∪ {v}) \ {v}. (In words, we switch v andv.) Go back to Step 1.
Repeat this procedure until the final substitute of v in the modified C 1 has x 1 at bottom. Then we can apply an f.e.p. resulting in x, so that x ∈ M β (R N ). 
Proof of Lemma 3.4. 4 For the implication (i)
We prove the implication (ii) ⇒ (i) by induction on the number of alternatives m. Let x ∈ A and assume that (ii) holds.
If m = 2, say A = {x, y}, then there is no S ∈ P 0 (N ) such that |S| ≥ β(x) and yR i x for all i ∈ S, so that M β (R N ) = {x}. Now suppose that m > 2 and that the implication (ii) ⇒ (i) holds if there are less than m alternatives. For every B ∈ P 0 (A \ {x}) denote S B = {i ∈ N : yR i x for all y ∈ B}. Then (ii) is equivalent to
hence to
We consider two cases.
Case 1 There exists B ∈ P 0 (A \ {x}) with | B| ≤ m − 2 and |N \ S B | = β( B).
For this case we consider the two following subproblems:
4 Also this result can be deduced from Theorem 9.3.6 in Peleg and Peters (2010) . It is included as Lemma 3.5 in Peleg and Peters (2017a) .
5 R i |B denotes the restriction of R i to B.
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We next show that (1) holds for the first subproblem. If not, then there is a
, which is a violation of (1) for the original problem. Therefore, (1) must hold for the first subproblem, implying that x ∈ M β1 (R N1 1 ) by induction.
Similarly, suppose that (1) does not hold for the second subproblem. Then there is a B ∈ P 0 (A \ ( B ∪ {x})) such that |T | ≥ β 2 (A 2 \ B) , where now
, which is a violation of (1) for the original problem. We conclude that (1) must hold for the second subproblem as well, so that x ∈ M β2 (R Since, in particular, yR i x for all y ∈ B and i ∈ N 2 = S B , it follows that
is an f.e.p. for the original problem, implying that in this case we have x ∈ M β (R N ).
Case 2 For all B ∈ P 0 (A \ {x}) with | B| ≤ m − 2 we have |N \ S B | > β( B).
Suppose there is an ∈ N such that x is not ranked at the last or second last position in R , and let y be the alternative ranked right below x. We switch x and y in voter 's preference to obtain a new preference R and a new preference profile R N = (R 1 , . . . , R −1 , R , R +1 , . . . , R N ) that still satisfies (2): for any set B with |B| ≤ m − 2 this holds because of the strict inequality in Case 2, and for B = A \ {x} this holds since x is not ranked last in R .
If Case 1 applies to R N , then x ∈ M β ( R N ). Thus, by Lemma 3.3, x ∈ M β (R N ). If Case 1 does not apply to R N , then we repeat this step for some voter ∈ N with x not ranked last or second last at R , and so on, until either Case 1 applies or there is no voter left with x not ranked at the last or second last position.
In the latter case, we have a profile, say R N , for which still (2) holds and with x ranked last or second last for each voter i ∈ N . Observe that y is last ranked for all voters in N \ S {y} for all y ∈ A \ {x}. Also, by (2), |N \ S {y} | ≥ β(y) for all y ∈ A \ {x}. It follows that in any f.e.p. for R N every y ∈ A \ {x} is bottom ranked by at least β(y) voters and therefore eliminated, so that M β ( R N ) = {x}. By Lemma 3.3 again, x ∈ M (R N ). By (2), Cases 1 and 2 are exhaustive, which completes the proof of the lemma.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.6
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 3.6.
6 It will be convenient to introduce some terminology related to effectivity functions.
7 Let F be a social choice function and let S ⊆ N and B ⊆ A. Then S is (F -)effective for B is there is
Of course, b(·) depends on F but this will be suppressed from notation if confusion is unlikely.
We start with three useful observations. Proof.
Lemma A.2. Let the SCF F be ESC and let S ⊆ N be effective for
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that F (R N ) = x and let Q N be a strong equilib-
Lemma A.3. Let the SCF F be ESC and anonymous, and assume that b(
, and x ∈ A \ B. In order to prove that x ∈ M b (R N ), it is by Lemma 3.4 sufficient to prove that we do not have yR i x for all y ∈ B and i ∈ S. On the contrary, suppose that yR i x for all y ∈ B and i ∈ S. Since |S| ≥ b(A \ B), Lemma A.1 implies that S is effective for B. Then Lemma A.2 implies that F (R N ) = x, a contradiction.
Notice that in order to obtain Proposition 3.6 we may try and derive the condition b(A) = n + 1 in Lemma A.3. This is, essentially, what is done in the remainder of the proof.
Lemma A.4. Let the SCF F be ESC, S ⊆ N , B ⊆ A, and suppose that for
Then S is effective for B.
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Proof. On the contrary, suppose that for every In what follows we will use the notion of a generalized partition or g-partition of a set, which is a partition in which some elements may be empty. Proof. Suppose not, so (g-)partitions as in the lemma exist. Consider a profile R N as in the following table:
(meaning that every member of coalition S 1 prefers all alternatives of B 2 over all alternatives of B 3 , all alternatives of B 3 over all alternatives of B 4 , and so on and so forth). Now by Lemma A.2, Proof. Suppose not, so (g-)partitions as in the lemma exist.
First, suppose S = N . Then for every i ∈ N , |N \ {i}| Let now S 1 , S 2 be a partition of S and consider a profile R N as in the following table:
Without loss of generality we assume that
Case 1: xQ i y for some i ∈ S, without loss of generality i ∈ S 1 , and y ∈ A \ {x}. In this case consider the partition {x}, {y}, A\{x, y} of A and the g-partition S \ {i}, {i}, T 1 ∪ T 2 of N . Since |S \ {i}| < b(x) we have that N \ (S \ {i}) is effective for {x} by Lemma A.4. By NVP and Lemma A.4 , N \ {i} is effective for {y}. Hence, by Lemma A.5, N \ (T 1 ∪ T 2 ) is not effective for A \ {x, y}. In turn, again by Lemma A.4, this implies that T 1 ∪ T 2 is effective for {x, y}.
Case 2: yQ i x for all i ∈ S and y ∈ A \ {x}. In this case, consider the partition {x}, B 1 , B 2 of A and the g-partition
we have by Lemma A.4 that N \ S 2 is effective for {x}. By assumption, N \T 2 is effective for B 2 . Hence by Lemma A.5, N \ (S 1 ∪ T 1 ) is not effective for B 1 , which in turn by Lemma A.4 implies that
, and z ∈ B 1 . By Lemma A.2,
. Since by assumption S 1 ∪ S 2 ∪ T 1 is effective for B 2 , by Case 2 yQ i x for all y ∈ B 2 and i ∈ S, and N \ T 2 is effective for B 2 , we have by Lemma A.2 that 
In the first case, Lemma A.6 is violated for the partition
In the second case, the induction hypothesis is violated for the partition
The next lemma says that an ESC social choice function is 'subadditive'.
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10 Cf. Moulin (1983 Thus, b(A) = n + 1, which concludes the proof.
